

DANGEROUS LIAISONS? DEBT SUPPLY AND CONVENIENCE YIELD SPILLOVERS IN THE EURO AREA

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The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Stability Mechanism.

MOTIVATION – WHAT MATTERS FOR LOW SOVEREIGN YIELDS?

- Low sovereign interest rates are key for fiscal sustainability
- When a country issues more sovereign bonds, its interest rate increases
 - Investors demand a higher return for buying additional bonds
- Does a country's interest rate also change when another country issues more bonds?
 - If investors buy more bonds from one country, do they buy fewer bonds from others?



MAIN RESULT: A NEW TYPE OF SPILLOVER!


- Debt issuance in one 'safe' euro area country drives up interest rates in other 'safe' countries as much as in the issuing country
 - A new type of fiscal spillover among 'safe' (core) euro area countries
- Non-core countries are less exposed to debt issuance spillovers from core countries


• These spillovers highlight the need for EU fiscal rules, not only to avert crises, but also to avoid disproportionate fiscal burdens in non-crisis times



SPILLOVERS FROM NEWS ABOUT GERMAN DEBT ISSUANCE

- On 14 December 2022 at 10:00 CET, the German debt management office ("Deutsche Finanzagentur") published its debt issuance plan for 2023
- Market commentary suggests that the total amount exceeded expectations







SPILLOVERS TO CORE VS. NON-CORE EURO AREA COUNTRIES

• Spillovers from Germany to other core countries are almost 1-for-1, but smaller to non-core countries

Table 4: Daily Yield Spillovers - German Debt Supply Shocks

| | (1) ΔY_{FR} | $\begin{array}{c} (2) \\ \Delta Y_{NL} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{c} (3) \\ \Delta Y_{FI} \end{array}$ | (4) ΔY_{AT} | $\begin{array}{c} (5) \\ \Delta Y_{BE} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{c} (6) \\ \Delta Y_{IT} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{c} (7) \\ \Delta Y_{ES} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{c} (8) \\ \Delta Y_{PT} \end{array}$ |
|-----------------|-----------------------|---|---|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|
| ΔY_{DE} | 0.989*** | 0.984*** | 1.088*** | 1.034*** | 1.175*** | 0.529 | 0.557 | 0.883 |
| Cons. | (0.116) 0.004 | (0.072) 0.001 | (0.090) 0.003 | (0.112) 0.002 | (0.288) 0.006 | (0.474) 0.015^* | (0.373) | (0.650) 0.016 |
| Obs. | $\frac{(0.003)}{44}$ | $\frac{(0.002)}{44}$ | $\frac{(0.002)}{44}$ | $\frac{(0.003)}{44}$ | $\frac{(0.006)}{44}$ | $\frac{(0.008)}{44}$ | $\frac{(0.008)}{44}$ | $\frac{(0.012)}{44}$ |
| R^2 | 0.830 | 0.958 | 0.938 | 0.849 | 0.470 | 0.288 | 0.335 | 0.150 |

Notes: Each column displays coefficients from a separate regression: $\Delta Y_{receiving} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \Delta Y_{DE} + \epsilon$, where the daily change in the German yield is instrumented with the 30-minute change. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.



SIMILAR SPILLOVERS FROM FRENCH DEBT ISSUANCE

Spillovers from France have a similar pattern: almost 1-for-1 to other core countries,
 but smaller to non-core countries

Table 7: Convenience yield spillovers from French supply shocks using the RS estimator


| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | ΔCY_{DE} | ΔCY_{NL} | ΔCY_{FI} | ΔCY_{AT} | ΔCY_{BE} | ΔCY_{IT} | ΔCY_{ES} | ΔCY_{PT} |
| ΔCY_{FR} | 1.259*** | 0.852** | 0.772* | 0.906*** | 0.949*** | -0.192 | 0.735 | 1.664 |
| | (0.388) | (0.350) | (0.430) | (0.272) | (0.307) | (0.542) | (0.636) | (4.142) |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Constant | 0.001 | 0.002 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.017 |
| | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.018) |
| N | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 |
| Weak IV | 4.576 | 5.131 | 3.926 | 3.950 | 4.848 | 3.969 | 3.991 | 7.614 |
| Overid. | 0.235 | 0.755 | 0.482 | 0.455 | 0.743 | 0.830 | 0.793 | 0.236 |

Notes: This table report coefficient estimates of equation $\Delta CY_{receiving} = \alpha + \beta \Delta CY_{FR} + \varepsilon$ using the RS estimator described in Section 4.4. Each column corresponds to a different receiving country.



CONVENIENCE YIELDS IN THE EURO AREA

- Core countries' bonds earn a premium the convenience yield – because these bonds provide not only a cash flow but also "convenient" services
 - These bonds are reliably liquid, remain valuable in recessions, and are insulated from risk contagion effects
- Not just one, but several euro area countries' bonds offer these services
 - Investors wanting to buy a safe asset can buy bonds from different sovereigns, which can be treated as substitutes





BOND SUBSTITUTION & CONVENIENCE YIELD SPILLOVERS

- Because core bonds are substitutes, issuance by one country diverts demand from other core countries
 - This explains spillovers among convenience yields and thus sovereign interest rates
- Issuance by core countries does not divert demand from non-core countries
 - Their bonds are imperfect substitutes for core bonds with different risk profiles, no flight-to-safety

• Our analyses show that spillovers among sovereign interest rates are indeed driven by convenience yields, not by monetary policy expectations or sovereign risk premia.



POLICY IMPLICATIONS

- If core euro area sovereign bonds are treated by investors as substitutes, then for maintaining low sovereign interest rates in the euro area ...
 - ... it matters how much debt is issued in total
 - ... it matters **less who issues it** (DE, FR, ...)
- This underscores the importance of coordinating national fiscal policies
 - Excessive debt issuance can not only lead to crises, but also to disproportionate fiscal burdens in non-crisis times
 - EU fiscal rules can address negative externalities of debt issuance

ESM Working Paper & ESM Blog will be published on 8 November!

